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Summary
The paper deals with distinguishing features of presidential systems of government adopt-
ed in the current or former constitutions of some Francophone African countries, such 
as Benin, Djibouti, Ivory Coast or the Republic of Congo. Particular attention has been 
devoted to the internal structure of the executive branch of government (the existence of 
the prime minister as a separate body) as well as to the reception of diverse mechanisms 
of rationalised parliamentarianism created previously in the constitution of the French 
Fifth Republic. The dynamics of constitutional changes leading to the adoption of pres-
identialism in place of semi-presidentialism and vice versa in such countries as Niger 
or Senegal has also been taken into account. In the light of the findings, it can be stated 
that the specific properties of presidentialism in Francophone Africa prove its apparent 
distinctness from certain typical assumptions of this model.
1 The Author is an Assistant Professor in the Chair of Constitutionalism and Systems of 
Government in the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Jagiellonian 
University in Cracow. E-mail: lukasz.jakubiak@uj.edu.pl.
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Streszczenie
Specyfika prezydenckich systemów rządu 
we francuskojęzycznych państwach afrykańskich
Artykuł omawia wyróżniające cechy prezydenckich systemów rządów przyjmowanych 
w obowiązujących lub wcześniejszych konstytucjach niektórych frankofońskich państw 
afrykańskich, takich jak Benin, Dżibuti, Wybrzeże Kości Słoniowej czy Republika Kon-
go. Szczególna uwaga została poświęcona wewnętrznej strukturze władzy wykonawczej 
(występowanie premiera jako odrębnego organu), jak również recepcji różnych mechaniz-
mów parlamentaryzmu zracjonalizowanego ustanowionych uprzednio w konstytucji V 
Republiki Francuskiej. Uwzględniona została również dynamika zmian konstytucyjnych 
prowadząca do przyjmowania, w państwach takich jak Niger czy Senegal, prezydencjal-
izmu w miejsce semiprezydencjalizmu i odwrotnie. Na podstawie dokonanych ustaleń, 
można stwierdzić, że specyficzne właściwości prezydencjalizmu w Afryce frankofońsk-
iej dowodzą jego ewidentnej odmienności od niektórych typowych założeń tego modelu.
*
I.
The system of government, defined as structures of the legislative and exec-
utive powers as well as the relationship between the two branches, belongs 
to one of the most important matters regulated, in more or less detail, in each 
basic law. Its specificity in a given country depends on many factors, includ-
ing earlier constitutional traditions and the impact of constitutional designs 
adopted elsewhere. It is beyond discussion that in the states born as a result 
of the collapse of colonial empires, constitutional regulations in the former 
metropole have remained a constant point of reference. Taking into consid-
eration specific political contexts in such countries, it is not surprising that 
the borrowing of institutional patterns has become a common phenomenon. 
However, the degree to which such reception takes place may vary widely. 
Regarding the system of government, the example of Francophone Africa il-
lustrates this diversity. Since the beginning of the transitional period follow-
ing the adoption of the French constitution of 1958, the states previously be-
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longing to the French colonial empire have adopted various constitutional 
mechanisms based on three basic models: parliamentarianism, presidential-
ism and semi-presidentialism. The latter has been constructed directly on the 
basis of the French experience of the Fifth Republic. Currently, it may be con-
sidered a dominant one in Francophone Africa. In turn, a parliamentary sys-
tem was a point of reference even before gaining full independence (mostly 
in 1960), but later it has lost its importance. This cannot be said about presi-
dentialism which seems to be – from today’s point of view – a model of prac-
tical significance2. Most importantly, it may be regarded as a real alternative 
to a semi-presidential construction.
It should be noted that a presidential regime was quite popular prior to the 
beginning of the democratisation process in the early 1990s, but still some 
Francophone African countries adopt its most important assumptions. The 
specificity of this system, however, is that it cannot be linked directly to its US 
counterpart. This is due to the fact that even in this case the impact of French 
constitutional designs remains clearly visible. Thus, the Francophone ver-
sion of presidentialism can be regarded as a product of the synthesis of vari-
ous constitutional solutions. Although its structure is based on a presidential 
construction (the responsibility of ministers only before the head of state), it 
has not been adopted in a pure form. However, it cannot be argued that pres-
identialism has been subjected to the process of parliamentarisation compa-
rable with that concerning systems of government introduced in some South 
American countries3. Hence, undisputed resignations from a classic presiden-
2 At the beginning of the 1960s, presidentialism became a dominant constitutional 
construction in this part of the world. For this reason, systems based on parliamentary respon-
sibility of the executive could be regarded as exceptions that proved the rule. D.G. Lavroff, 
Les systèmes constitutionnels en Afrique noire. Les États francophones, Paris 1976, pp. 21–25.
3 A parliamentarised version of presidentialism can be found in the countries such as 
Argentina, Peru and Venezuela. In addition to the existence of the head of government, which 
functions in the executive branch next to the president, the mechanisms that have been in-
troduced in the aforementioned states are based on the ability of parliaments to influence the 
political composition of cabinets. Even if constitutional requirements are quite difficult to meet 
in this respect, this is a sign of pro-parliamentary tinge of some presidential systems in this 
part of the world. That is why they are even included in hybrid regimes defined as structures 
in which prime ministers and cabinets are subject to parliamentary confidence. J.M. Carey, 
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government, [in:] Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 
eds. C. Ménard, M.M. Shirley, Berlin– Heidelberg 2008, pp. 92–93, 95–96.
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tial model in no. way brings such African regimes to semi-presidential ones. 
Anyway, two issues require particular attention. These are the introduction 
of the prime minister into presidentialism as well as the adoption of some 
mechanisms of rationalised parliamentarianism and their incorporation into 
to the architecture based on French constitutional designs applied after 1958.
Points of reference for this research will be current and former presiden-
tial constitutions of countries such as Benin (the basic law of 1990)4, Djibouti 
(the constitution adopted in 1992 and largely amended in 2010)5, Ivory Coast 
(the basic laws of 2000 and 2016)6 and the Republic of Congo (the constitu-
tion of 20027 replaced, after thirteen years, by a new semi-presidential basic 
law). It should be borne in mind, however, that a departure from semi-pres-
identialism in order to introduce a presidential regime can also be seen in 
some other Francophone African states, but such modifications do not usu-
ally produce long-lasting effects. The best example of such dynamics is Ni-
ger, where the system of government has been, during the past thirty years, 
repeatedly changed from a semi-presidential to a presidential one and vice 
versa (presidential constitutions were adopted in 1996 and 20098). Similar 
transformations have occurred in Senegal. Quite frequent regime chang-
4 Loi nº 90-32 du 11 décembre 1990 portant Constitution de la République du Bénin, http://
www.cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org/lacourpresent/decrets/Constitution.pdf (7.09.2017).
5 La Constitution du 15 septembre 1992; Loi Constitutionnelle n° 92/AN/10/6ème L 
portant révision de la Constitution, http://www.presidence.dj/TexteFond.php (9.09.2017). 
It is worth noting that Djibouti gained independence only in 1977, seventeen years later than 
most African countries previously constituting French overseas possessions in Africa. Before 
that, this part of the former colonial empire of France had been called the French Territory 
of the Afars and the Issas (Territoire français des Afars et des Issas). S. El Mansour Cerkaoui, 
Djibouti, [in:] Historical Dictionary of European Imperialism, ed. J.S. Olson, New York–West-
port–London 1991, pp. 175–176.
6 Loi n° 2000–513 du 1er août 2000 portant Constitution de la Côte d’Ivoire, http://
www.assnat.ci/assembleenationale/IMG/pdf/loi_n_2000-513_du_1er_aout_2000.pdf 
(7.09.2017); Loi n° 2016–886 du 8 novembre 2016 portant Constitution de la République de 
Côte d’Ivoire, http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ivc160760.pdf (9.09.2017).
7 Constitution de la République du Congo du 20 janvier 2002, http://cour-constitution-
nelle.cg/docs/constitution-congolaise.pdf (7.09.2017).
8 Constitution de la IVème République, http://www.cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/
documents/constitution_4eme_rep.pdf (7.09.2017); Constitution de la VIème République, 
http://www.cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/031_tf_txt_constitution_5e-
me_rep.pdf (7.09.2017).
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es began within a few years after gaining independence in 1960 and took 
place over longer periods of time (until the enactment, at the beginning of 
the new millennium, the current semi-presidential basic law of 2001). Even 
if presidential regimes existing in the aforementioned countries after the 
commencement of the first democratic reforms were rather short-lived (es-
pecially in the case of Niger between 1996–1999 and 2009–2010) and have 
been ultimately rejected, their respective basic laws should also be taken 
into account. Dynamic institutional reforms show clearly that there still ex-
ists a strong tension between presidential architectures and their semi-pres-
idential counterparts. Hence, a discussion on which of these two models 
has more advantages and seems to be better for Francophone countries in 
Africa cannot be considered complete.
II.
One of distinguishing features of presidential systems in Francophone Afri-
ca is a design of the executive branch of government composed of the prime 
minister functioning next to the head of state. The aforementioned structur-
al factor can be seen, among others, in Djibouti. In the light of the 1992 ba-
sic law, the executive power belongs exclusively to the president of the Re-
public who has also been given the role of the head of government (Art. 21). 
The regulation clearly indicates that the executive power is fully subordinated 
to the head of state elected by universal suffrage9. Thus, it is difficult to assume 
that in the African countries under discussion a real duality of the executive 
branch have been introduced. The dualism is visible only from a structural 
perspective, whereas the functional criterion does not give grounds for draw-
ing such a conclusion. In Djibouti, the principle according to which all ex-
ecutive power rests in the hands of the head of state is confirmed by Art. 41. 
This provision states that the president is supported (est assisté) by the gov-
ernment composed of the prime minister and other ministers. As a result, 
9 Because of the adoption of presidential or semi-presidential systems, universal elections 
are a typical mechanism of taking over the presidency in Francophone Africa. The absolute 
majority system, where two rounds of voting usually occur, is most commonly used. I.M. Fall, 
Le pouvoir executive dans le constitutionnalisme des États d’Afrique, Paris 2008, pp. 69–78.
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a limited role of the prime minister comes down to animating and coordi-
nating government activity. Such a function was explicitly attributed to it in 
the 2000 constitution of Ivory Coast, while the president remained the sole 
holder of the executive power (détenteur exclusif du pouvoir exécutif) (Art. 41). 
Although the prime minister, not the president, was named the head of gov-
ernment, the constitutional role of the so-constructed cabinet consists in as-
sisting the president and advising him in the process of governance. The cur-
rent Ivorian constitution of 2016 repeats these regulations. According to its 
Art. 81, the task of the government is to implement the policy of the nation 
(la politique de la Nation) as defined by the president. The supportive posi-
tioning of the government corresponds to the role of the head of state as an 
organ that not only determines but also conducts the state policy (for exam-
ple, Art. 54 of the 1990 constitution of Benin). Consequently, the cabinet au-
tonomy perceived through the prism of the ability to determine the political 
line within a given range, has no. reason to exist10 (understandably, a strong-
er position of the government in this respect occurs in those states that have 
adopted a semi-presidential model, although even in this case, the presiden-
cy is, most often, much more powerful than in the light of the 1958 consti-
tution of France11). This means that the prime minister and other ministers 
are only ancillary to the head of state. The latter is able to revoke them at any 
time, thus without having to meet any preconditions (such as a prior volun-
tary resignation of the prime minister without which the dismissal would not 
bring any effects12).
10 As P. Danho Nandjui noted, unlike in France, the prime minister has no. reserved 
domain in relation to the head of state. P. Danho Nandjui, La prééminence constitutionnelle du 
Président de la République en Côte d’Ivoire, Paris–Budapest–Torino 2004, p. 42.
11 For this reason, African semi-presidentialism is located, in terms of its constitutional 
regulation, between the French semi-presidential model and a typical presidential one. For 
more on this topic see: Ł. Jakubiak, Semiprezydencjalizm we frankofońskich państwach Afryki 
Subsaharyjskiej, [in:] Systemy rządów w perspektywie porównawczej, ed. J. Szymanek, Warszawa 
2014, pp. 332–340.
12 It is characteristic of France, where – formally speaking – the head of state cannot 
dismiss the prime minister without the consent of the latter. Such a requirement is regulated 
in Art. 8 of the 1958 constitution, although in practice its significance emerged only after the 
occurrence of cohabitation in the mid-1980s. For more on this topic see: M.A. Cohendet, Le 
président de la République, Paris 2002, pp. 58–60.
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It leads to the conclusion that the cabinet does not enjoy the autonomy 
typical of a parliamentary model, nor even the partial autonomy that, in 
a semi-presidential system, may derive from the partisan composition of the 
legislative body (at least in the conditions of cohabitation, when the presi-
dent loses some of the instruments to influence the government). In turn, 
under presidentialism, parliamentary majorities have no. impact on the ex-
istence and functioning of the cabinet. The latter body is dependent solely on 
the head of state, which decides on appointments to government positions. 
It should be emphasized that the analysed constitutions do not contain any 
solutions which could suggest that there is a relationship between the political 
structure of cabinets and parliamentary majorities created after each legisla-
tive elections. Therefore, the regimes cannot be classified as semi-presidential 
ones. According to the restrictive principles of a pure presidential model, par-
liaments in the Francophone African states that have adopted this system of 
government have no. constitutional tools that would allow them to influence 
the composition of cabinets. However, even the aforementioned formalisa-
tion of the government as a separate body proves, despite the lack of its polit-
ical connections with the legislature, that presidentialism in these countries 
is to some degree modified against the US model. On the other hand, it must 
be stressed that such constitutionalisation of the government headed by the 
prime minister is not a construction from which there are no. exceptions. 
A fully monistic structure of the executive power within a presidential mod-
el was foreseen in the Congolese basic law of 2002. This act contained regula-
tions applicable to the president, ministers and the Council of Ministers. The 
term ‘government’ was used sporadically and most often concerned all the ex-
ecutive power led by the president. The latter was explicitly referred to as the 
head of the executive branch (le chef de l’exécutif) and the head of government 
(le chef du gouvernement) (Art. 56). A similar approach has been applied in 
the 1990 constitution of Benin, though the prime minister began to function 
as a non-constitutional body (however, the post has been finally abolished)13.
13 It is worth mentioning that frequent changes concerning the very existence of the 
prime minister as a political institution built into the structure of the executive power belong 
to specific features of this country. Taking into account the period since the beginning of the 
1990s, this post has been established and liquidated several times. Currently, under the pres-
idential government, it does not exist. This is due to the fact that directly after the presidential 
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Consequently, the very existence of the prime minister, which is not equipped 
with significant competencies, does not affect the scope of presidential pow-
ers14. In particular, such a structure of the executive branch (and, above all, 
a clear hierarchy within it) implies that the requirement for countersignature 
concerning presidential acts would have no. specific justification15. It should 
be stressed that the countries under discussion have adopted a rather typi-
cal structure of presidential powers, although attention should be paid to the 
fact that many of them were taken directly from the semi-presidential archi-
tecture of the Fifth Republic. For example, presidents may exercise extraor-
dinary powers in the event of a threat to the state and its institutions, which 
have been modelled on Art. 16 of the 1958 constitution16. More or less visible 
similarities occur in the case of such competencies as presiding the meetings 
elections of 2016, Patrice Talon, the newly-elected head of state, decided not to institutionalise 
the prime minister any longer. Five years earlier, such a solution had been introduced (howev-
er, without amending any provisions of the basic law) by his predecessor Thomas Boni Yayi. 
V. Duhem, Bénin: Patrice Talon nomme un gouvernement sans Premier ministre, 07.04.2016, http://
www.jeuneafrique.com/316256/politique/benin-patrice-talon-nomme-gouvernement-pre-
mier-ministre (21.09.2017).
14 By the way, the same refers to the institution of the vice president which is not foreign 
to constitutionalism in Francophone Africa. As for the constitutional regulations in force, 
such a body can be found in the 2016 basic law of Ivory Coast. In the light of its Art. 80, the 
vice president acts on the basis of a presidential delegation. Moreover, the constitution states 
that the vice president can chair the Council of Ministers when the head of state is absent.
15 The logic of countersignature, however, is in line with parliamentarianism and, at least 
to some extent, semi-presidentialism. Under the conditions of a pure parliamentary system, 
in which all or most of the presidential powers require countersignature, this contributes 
to ensuring, at least in principle, political neutrality of the head of state. In a semi-presidential 
model based on a dualistic version of parliamentarianism, in which the position of the head of 
state is considerably stronger than in a monistic one, the countersignature exists but its scope is 
significantly limited. Its role is mainly to provide coordination of activities that are taken inside 
a complex structure of the executive composed of two strong and autonomous political actors. 
The importance of countersignature as a tool to restrict the position of the head of state grows 
only in the course of cohabitation. For more on this topic on the example of France from the 
Third to the Fifth Republic see: B. Branchet, Contribution à l’étude de la Constitution de 1958. 
Le contreseing et le régime politique de la Ve République, Paris 1996, pp. 34–41.
16 For more on this topic see: Ł. Jakubiak, Artykuł 16 Konstytucji V Republiki Francuskiej 
jako wzorzec regulacji instytucji stanu nadzwyczajnego w państwach Afryki frankofońskiej, [in:] 
Stan nadzwyczajny. Analizy z perspektywy nauk politycznych i prawnych, eds. J. Markiewicz-
-Stanny, P. Łukomski, Zielona Góra 2015, pp. 261–277.
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of the Council of Ministers, conducting nationwide referendums or partici-
pating in the procedure of introducing constitutional amendments. On the 
other hand, there are also noticeable differences that arise either from the 
structure of presidentialism itself or from the specificity of its reception in 
Francophone Africa. The inability of the head of state to dissolve the parlia-
ment may be taken into account in this context17. Besides, the president is also 
referred to as the head of administration (for example, Art. 67 of the 2016 con-
stitution of Ivory Coast). Such regulations should be seen through the prism 
of the hierarchy within the whole executive branch. Attention should also be 
paid to delivering messages to the parliament as a competence that has been 
built according to a different scheme than in the French basic law of the Fifth 
Republic. For example, such a specific construction was regulated in Art. 61 
of the Nigerien constitution of 1996. On the basis of this provision, the pres-
ident had to deliver, before the first chamber, a state of the state message ev-
ery year, on the anniversary of taking over the presidency.
III.
The process of rationalising the system of government is commonly asso-
ciated with a parliamentary model, in which the cabinet composed of the 
prime minister and other ministers is politically responsible before the leg-
islature. Under such conditions, the rationalisation serves primarily to bal-
ance the position of the parliament and the government by limiting the for-
mer and strengthening the latter. The purpose of such activities is to provide 
political stabilisation by preventing unusually frequent government crises18. 
17 However, it is worth pointing to the change of the Senegalese constitution, which took 
place in 1967. The structure of presidentialism was supplemented by the presidential competence 
to dissolve the National Assembly without the simultaneous introduction of a motion of censure 
as a counterbalancing factor. Ł. Jakubiak, System ustrojowy Senegalu, Kraków 2014, pp. 26–27.
18 This kind of dysfunctionality of parliamentarianism is characteristic of its monistic 
version (this variant had existed before the process of rationalisation began in the mid-twentieth 
century), in which the parliament de facto dominates both segments of the executive power. 
J. Gicquel, J.É. Gicquel, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, Issy-les-Moulineaux 
2015, pp. 161. Under such conditions, the position of the head of state is far reduced. It can 
be said that the body becomes only a neutral political observer. This makes – despite formal 
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Under rationalised parliamentarianism, the cabinet should have a consistent 
and predictable majority in the chamber (or chambers) of parliament, which 
is capable of overthrowing the government by passing a motion of censure 
(however, such a possibility has to be more or less restricted by constitution-
al provisions). It deserves highlighting that various instruments of rational-
ised parliamentarianism exist in a semi-presidential model, which should be 
considered as an outcome of the most far-reaching rationalising activities. In 
turn, it is not possible to apply such rationalisation to a presidential model. 
On the other hand, not all the mechanisms for limiting the role of the leg-
islative branch are based on the relationship between the executive and the 
parliament. This means that at least some of them can be successfully incor-
porated into structures of other systems of government, including those that 
are not linked to a parliamentary one. The latter concerns different varieties 
of presidentialism. Regardless of their detailed construction, each of them can 
adapt those rationalising solutions which do not require the existence of the 
principle of responsibility of the government before a legislative body. The es-
sence of the problem is the rationalisation which affects not parliamentari-
anism seen through the prism of the system of government (because it is not 
the case), but solely the parliament as one of the state organs.
As indicated above, as for specific presidential regimes adopted in former 
French colonies in Africa, the concept of rationalised parliamentarianism 
cannot refer to the relationship between the executive and legislative because 
such links have not been based on the principle of parliamentary responsibil-
ity of the cabinet. Hence, particular attention should be paid to some other 
components of rationalisation, including the scope and conduct of legislative 
proceedings. The mechanisms that have been introduced in this area can be 
regarded as a common denominator of all systems of government in the Af-
rican states that emerged after the collapse of the French colonial empire19. 
duality of the executive branch – the whole executive power to be in the hands of the govern-
ment headed by the prime minister. However, the status of the latter does not necessarily lead 
to the strengthening of its position vis-à-vis other ministers. Such parliamentarianism is also 
described as absolute one (parlementarisme absolu). For more on this topic see: D. Turpin, Le 
régime parlementaire, Paris 1997, pp. 54–62.
19 However, not all constitutional instruments based on the concept of rationalised 
parliamentarianism can be found in French constitutionalism. Taking into consideration the 
constitutions in the Francophone Africa that were adopted after the creation of the French 
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In this respect, the regulations contained in the constitution of the Fifth Re-
public have been a universal point of reference. From this perspective, at least 
some fundamental differences between parliamentarianism, semi-presiden-
tialism and presidentialism do not matter much. Anyway, specific constitu-
tional solutions of this kind have an indirect influence on the relationship be-
tween the executive and legislative irrespective of the system of government 
chosen by the creators of one or another constitutional order. Suffice it to say 
that the restrictions imposed on the parliament affect its position vis-à-vis 
the executive even if their aim is not to protect the cabinet threatened by an 
opposing parliamentary majority capable of overthrowing it. Although the 
latter possibility does not exist within a presidential model, such rationalis-
ing measures have a visible impact on the position of major political institu-
tions, in particular providing further means to maintain actual superiority 
of the executive over the uni- or bicameral legislature.
In the case of systems of government of Francophone Africa, attention 
should be drawn principally to the constitutional limitation of the extent 
to which the parliament exercises its legislative function. Just like in France, 
setting a strict framework for this leads to a clear strengthening of the execu-
tive. Such powers of the latter branch are therefore presumed, while the scope 
of legislative activity of the parliament is directly defined in the constitution. 
For example, in the light of the 2016 constitution of Ivory Coast, legislative 
powers of the bicameral parliament (composed of the National Assembly and 
the Senate) are – as in the case of the 1958 basic law of France – enumerat-
ed (Art. 101). As for other areas, which are not clearly listed, legal acts placed 
at the legislative level can be issued by the executive (Art. 103). This consti-
tutes a so-called regulatory authority (pouvoir réglementaire). It should be 
noted that the issuance of such provisions is the responsibility of the head 
of state (Art. 65). Besides, the president has the ability to create ordinances 
Community (Communauté française) in 1958 but before gaining independence, it deserves to be 
highlighted that some of them introduced a constructive vote of no. confidence as a mechanism 
for rationalisation of parliamentarianism taken from Germany (the 1949 constitution). Hence, 
Gérard Conac states that, in terms of rationalisation, some of the then basic laws went even 
further than the constitution of the Fifth Republic of France. G. Conac, L’évolution constitu-
tionnelle des États francophones d’Afrique Noire et de la République Démocratique Malgache, [in:] 
Les institutions constitutionnelles des États d’Afrique francophone et de la République Malgache, 
ed. idem, Paris 1979, pp. 42.
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(ordonnances) in the fields that are normally regulated within the legislative 
(Art. 106). A prior consent of the legislature for the presidential activity of 
this kind is required. This is understandable because the presidential power 
serves to further restrict the position of the parliament in the whole law-mak-
ing process. It needs to be emphasized that the above-mentioned division of 
powers between the executive and legislative has been based on the mecha-
nism employed by the authors of the constitution of the French Fifth Repub-
lic, but there is one significant difference. It comes down to the body, which is 
responsible for issuing such legal acts. In the presidential systems under con-
sideration this power belongs to the head of state and not to the government. 
Unlike semi-presidentialism based on the bicephalous structure of the exec-
utive branch, in a presidential model in which the cabinet remains politically 
dependent on the president and responsible solely before him, such strength-
ening of the cabinet would contradict the conception of the executive power, 
according to which the function of the government should be limited to as-
sisting the head of state.
Another manifestation of the reinforcement of the executive at the ex-
pense of the legislature is the very conduct of legislative proceedings within 
the bicameral parliament. For example, appropriate mechanisms based on 
the idea of rationalisation have been regulated in the aforementioned 2016 
constitution of Ivory Coast, in which a unicameral structure of the parlia-
ment has been replaced by a bicameral one. Thanks to this, some French 
constitutional patterns taken directly from the constitution of the Fifth Re-
public could be adopted. It is a model of a relatively strong second chamber 
which additionally assumes a constant interference of the executive with the 
relations between both segments of the legislative power. As in the case of 
ordinances, it is the president who has been given the opportunity to decide 
on the course of legislative activity of the parliament. First, in the event of 
a conflict between the National Assembly and the Senate, the head of state 
may order the establishment of a mixed parity committee (commission mix-
te paritaire) composed of parliamentarians belonging to one or other cham-
bers. The text which was agreed by the committee could then be put to the 
vote in both of them. The decision in this regard is taken by the president. 
Moreover, if there is no. agreement between the chambers, the head of state 
may decide that the second chamber is excluded from further legislative 
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proceedings. In such a situation, the final decision on a given text is taken 
exclusively by the National Assembly (Art. 110). Undoubtedly, the activi-
ties in the triangle composed of the president and both segments of the leg-
islature are a copy of the procedure of the last word (dernier mot) granted 
to the first chamber, which is known from French Fifth Republic. A strik-
ing difference consists, however, in replacing the government and the prime 
minister by the head of state.
Thus, in the case of presidential regimes in Francophone Africa, it is the 
president who is able to make use of this kind of controlled bicameralism. As 
in the case of the regulatory authority mentioned above, the government, as 
a body assisting the head of state, plays no. remarkable role in this area. It de-
serves to be highlighted that the president has even the right to initiate legis-
lation. This is yet another proof that in the discussed group of states the in-
troduction of mechanisms that have been operating within the Fifth Republic 
for several decades has been modified in order to further strengthen the con-
stitutional status of the head of state. This indicates that rationalised parlia-
mentarianism do not necessarily mean that the beneficiary of such actions is 
the government composed of the prime minister and other ministers. Since 
the president is the exclusive holder of the executive power, there is no. rea-
son for this organ to be deprived the right to actively participate in various 
aspects of a broadly understood law-making process20. On the other hand, 
it must be borne in mind that the condition sine qua non of the reception of 
some of the aforementioned tools is a bicameral structure of the legislature. 
20 The reinforcement of the presidency in this area, as compared to French constitutional 
standards, also occurs in some of semi-presidential systems that have been introduced in 
former French dependent territories. This is understandable because semi-presidentialism in 
Africa creates, in general, much more favourable conditions for strong presidential power than 
its French counterpart. This results not only from the aforementioned strong position of the 
president in the legislative procedure, but above all from the principle of dual responsibility 
of the government (not exclusively before the legislature but also before the head of state) 
which is usually formally expressed in appropriate constitutional acts. Such a structure of links 
between both branches means that in the event of a conflict between the head of state and 
a parliamentary majority, the actual presidential power is weaker, but this weakening does not 
go too far. Thus, it does not result in the loss of a strong position that has been constitutionally 
guaranteed. G. Conac, Semi-Presidentialism in a Francophone Context, [in:] Semi-Presidentialism 
Outside Europe. A Comparative Study, eds. R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, London–New York 2007, p. 88.
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Otherwise, the construction of rationalised parliamentarianism may include 
only those instruments that do not require a concrete structure of the legis-
lative branch. Apart from the 2016 constitution of Ivory Coast, bicameralism 
was foreseen in the 2002 constitution of Congo. According to the act, the Na-
tional Assembly and the Senate exercised the legislative power. It should be 
stressed, however, that a new semi-presidential basic law of this country, en-
acted in 2015, has not departed from this model. As for unicameralism, this 
is the case of Ivory Coast (before the entry into force of the 2016 constitu-
tion), Benin (according to Art. 79 of the 1990 constitution the parliament is 
composed of the National Assembly) or Djibouti (a single chamber has been 
adopted in Art. 44 of the 1992 basic law)21.
IV.
The reasons for which presidential systems in some Francophone African 
states have been introduced (or were introduced in the past) deserves spe-
cial consideration. The dynamics of constitutional reforms in some of the 
states under discussion indicates that today the basic dilemma is the choice 
between semi-presidentialism modelled on the constitution of the French 
Fifth Republic and the above-described presidential architecture in its mod-
ified form. The best example of frequent changes in this area is Niger. Af-
ter the beginning of the democratisation process in the early 1990s, the re-
jection of a semi-presidential model in order to introduce presidentialism 
took place twice, in 1996 and 2009. The causes for this modification were 
not the same. In the mid-nineties, there was the phenomenon of cohabi-
tation, similar to what had occurred in France before. A deep conflict be-
tween the president and the prime minister from different political camps 
21 For more on unicameralism and bicameralism in Francophone Africa see: A. Cabanis, 
M.L. Martin, Les constitutions d’Afrique francophone. Évolutions récentes, Paris 1999, pp. 113–125. 
It is worth emphasizing that in African states previously belonging to the French empire (re-
gardless of whether they have introduced a presidential system or a semi-presidential one), 
a bicameral construction of the legislative power has not been commonly adopted. In some 
countries, the legislative structure is subject to certain modifications (for example, the creation 
of the Senate in Ivory Coast as a result of the enactment of the 2016 basic law or the abolition 
of the body in Senegal at the beginning of Macky Sall’s presidency).
63Łukasz Jakubiaka • The Specificity of Presidential Systems of Government
lasted nearly a year and ended in an undemocratic way – a military coup22. 
After the takeover of power, new military authorities decided to abolish the 
duality of the executive branch and to depart from the principle of its po-
litical responsibility before the parliament. Such a step resulted in the res-
toration of a presidential regime. Under new constitutional conditions, re-
occurrence of cohabitation was not possible. After three years, the return 
to civilian rule led to the adoption of another semi-presidential constitution, 
which, however, contained specific ‘safety valves’ – innovative regulations 
on a new division of powers within the executive in the event of cohabita-
tion (it was less favourable for the head of state than in normal conditions). 
Similar provisions to be applied during such a political conflict have also 
been adopted in the 2010 constitution. However, political configurations 
created after presidential or parliamentary elections have never led to the 
emergence of a politically heterogeneous executive power.
The introduction or reintroduction of presidentialism ma also take place 
in a different political context. In such a situation, the aim is not (or not ex-
clusively) to verify the functioning of the systems generating concrete con-
stitutional problems because of conflicts within the internally divided exec-
utive controlled by opposing camps, but mainly to seek to expand the scope 
of presidential powers. Such a scenario may be implemented in various polit-
ical situations, also when the head of state wants to strengthen its actual posi-
tion because some disagreements within the ruling camp emerge. The latter 
situation occurred in Senegal after a few years that had passed since gaining 
independence from France. The attempts of the then prime minister Mam-
madou Dia to reinforce his political status ended with a reaction of president 
Léopold Sédar Senghor who decided to significantly amend the existing con-
stitution in order to strengthen the presidency. After a dozen or so weeks, 
a completely new basic law was adopted. Its specific provisions were prepared 
with a view to the principles of a presidential model23. In this way, Senegal 
joined the countries that introduced this system of government immediate-
ly after they had become independent, such as Ivory Coast, Niger or Upper 
Volta (today’s Burkina Faso). However, the first Senegalese experience with 
22 S. Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism in Niger. Gridlock and Democratic Breakdown – Learn-
ing From Past Mistakes, [in:] Semi-Presidentialism Outside..., pp. 114–115.
23 D.G. Lavroff, La République du Sénégal, Paris 1966, pp. 47–60.
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this model was relatively short (it lasted until 1970)24. In view of the above, it 
can be said that in some respects, the circumstances of the transition to pres-
identialism were similar to what happened in Niger in 1996. In both cases 
the background was a conflict within the executive branch, but in the latter 
country it occurred between two different camps, not within one ruling po-
litical party. It should also be highlighted that in Senegal, the introduction of 
a presidential system led to the reinforcement of the position of the then in-
cumbent president, while in Niger it resulted from the overthrow of the head 
of state. Besides, a military coup may also serve to defend semi-presidential-
ism. In 2009, President Mamadou Tandja conducted a constitutional referen-
dum and reintroduced in Niger a presidential system25. However, this attempt 
did not bring long-term results. The president lost his office a few months lat-
er and a semi-presidential architecture was then restored.
V.
The presented analysis of systems of government in the states created in the 
aftermath of the fall of the French colonial empire, which continue to apply 
or previously applied mechanisms typical of presidentialism, shows that this 
model represents the most important alternative to the semi-presidential re-
gime taken directly from the 1958 constitution of France. A parliamentary 
model, in which the position of the president is significantly reduced, does not 
constitute an important point of reference in the African context. It should be 
emphasized that the adoption of a presidential model by some former French 
colonies does not mean that there has been no. reception of many constitu-
tional mechanisms solutions known in the former metropole. Hence, in terms 
24 A pure presidential system was restored in the early 1980s, after taking over the presidency 
by Abdou Diouf. F. Zuccarelli, La vie politique sénégalaise (1940–1988), Paris 1988, p. 170. For 
more on the adoption of a presidential model in Senegal and some other regime changes in this 
country after receiving independence from France see: S.M. Sy, Les régimes politiques sénégalais 
de l’indépendance à l’alternance politique 1960–2008, Yaoundé–Paris–Dakar 2009, pp. 43–158. 
Ł. Jakubiak, Dynamika przekształceń konstytucyjnego modelu rządów w Republice Senegalu, [in:] 
Aktualne problemy reform konstytucyjnych, ed. S. Bożyk, Białystok 2013, pp. 613–629.
25 S. Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism in Africa. Patterns and Trends, [in:] Semi-Presiden-
tialism and Democracy, eds. R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, Y.S. Wu, Basingstoke 2011, pp. 147–148.
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of the wording of concrete regulations contained in basic laws, there is a lot 
of convergence between presidential and semi-presidential systems in Fran-
cophone Africa. Differences concern basically the most important structural 
constructions such as the inability of the president to dissolve the legislature 
or the inability of the latter body to overthrow the government26. On the oth-
er hand, these essential structural components indicate that presidentialism 
in Francophone Africa is a construct substantially different from semi-pres-
idential designs that had been previously adopted in the Fifth Republic. The 
most important is the principle of parliamentary responsibility of ministers, 
without regard to which any system of government cannot be identified as 
a semi-presidential one. The principle designates, as part of a parliamentary 
regime, the key element of every variant of semi-presidentialism. This also ap-
plies to the formula of the aforementioned model which remains highly pres-
identialised, being similar to presidentialism itself. It is also worth mention-
ing that these similarities can be seen primarily in the political practice. Its 
distinctive feature is that in both cases the head of state dominates the po-
litical system without encountering any major institutional constraints. This 
effect is related to the political structure of parliaments in which presidential 
parties (political formations whose actual leaders are presidents and whose 
main task is to support the implementation of the presidential electoral pro-
gramme) hold, most often, a stable majority. This results in the fact that for-
mal rules are not essential, which leads to the blurring of differences between 
presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. In short, regardless of the system 
of government, the practice favours a strong presidency that is guaranteed at 
both constitutional and political level. The formal institutional structure is 
not important enough to significantly change that.
Regardless of whether presidentialism or semi-presidentialism has been 
adopted in a particular state, the links to French constitutionalism are still 
clearly visible, although in the case of presidential systems some initial con-
stitutional solutions have been modified to a greater extent. This includes, in-
ter alia, the application of mechanisms based on rationalised parliamentar-
ianism in the course of legislative proceedings within bicameral legislatures. 
26 For more on this topic on the example of presidentialism in Ivory Coast and semi-pres-
identialism in Senegal see: Ł. Jakubiak, The Systems of Government of Senegal and Ivory Coast. 
Comparative Analysis, “Politeja” 2016, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 247–261.
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The structure of relatively asymmetric bicameralism consisting in the pos-
sibility to neutralise (as a result of decisions taken by the executive) the sec-
ond chamber during the parliamentary work on a bill has been introduced 
without major changes. However, monism of the executive branch of govern-
ment, which remains fully subordinate to the president, implies, however, that 
the head of state can also exert a permanent impact on the process of creat-
ing legislation. Conversely, in the case of semi-presidential systems in most 
Francophone African countries this kind of enhancement of presidency is not 
excluded (as evidenced by the Senegalese constitution of 2001), but it is not 
a natural consequence of this system of government. If this is the case, it is 
legitimate to believe that a more or less presidentialised version of semi-pres-
identialism has been adopted in a given country. In addition to dual respon-
sibility of the government, the active participation of the head of state in the 
lawmaking process is then noticeable. The president is then able to interfere 
with such proceedings. Otherwise, the head of state could exert such influ-
ence only indirectly, that is through the cabinet.
It must also be borne in mind that the very existence of the post of the 
prime minister as the head of government, which is fully dependent on the 
head of state and politically irresponsible to the parliament, is not the feature 
that distinguished or still distinguishes all presidential systems in former 
French colonies. Before 2016, a specific construction could be found in Be-
nin, that is the establishment of the prime minister outside the provisions of 
the constitution. Regardless of the form of inclusion of the institution to the 
structure of presidentialism, it is difficult to treat its introduction as a signifi-
cant modification of this system of government. It is surely not sufficient to say 
that it leads to a pro-parliamentary tinge of these presidential systems. The 
most important element of this model, that is the lack of political responsi-
bility of the cabinet before the parliament, remains intact. As a consequence, 
there is no. reason to state the existence of parliamentarised variant of pres-
identialism, which would somehow resemble a similar formula occurring in 
presidential systems adopted in South America. This is also proved by oth-
er mechanisms and institutions (or the absence thereof), such as the afore-
mentioned presidential inability to dissolve the parliament or a ban on exer-
cising ministerial functions for members of parliament. On the other hand, 
there are some breaches in the finally adopted design of presidentialism that 
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violate the principle of strict separation of all three authorities. Such an ex-
ception is the presidential legislative initiative which, however, fits into active 
participation of the head of state in a broadly understood law-making process.
Moreover, the presidential systems under discussion deserve some atten-
tion because of their political importance as remarkable remedies to revealed 
disadvantages of semi-presidentialism. The most serious problem that aris-
es in here is a possible violent conflict within the executive branch, which in 
the worst case can lead to a complete paralysis of the governance structures. 
On the other hand, political practice in many countries has shown that the 
consequence of applying such a configuration is not a very likely scenario27. 
Anyway, a departure from semi-presidentialism can be seen as a form of fur-
ther stabilisation of the whole system of government by eliminating potential 
risk factors. From this point of view, presidential systems in which the execu-
tive is not politically linked to the parliament, seem more predictable. It must 
be highlighted, however, that in the case of Francophone African states, the 
transition to presidentialism is sometimes conditioned by attempts to further 
strengthen the position of the head of state. This does not mean that the re-
jection of a semi-presidential model has become an obvious choice. On the 
contrary, this system of government still exists in a large number of former 
French colonies in Africa. It may even be concluded that, after the begin-
ning of the democratisation process in the early 1990s, its significance has in-
creased because the need to introduce more or less internally balanced exec-
utives was emphasized at that time28. However, this does not change the fact 
that although semi-presidentialism has its obvious weaknesses, pure presi-
dentialism can also raise serious objections (for example, excessive concen-
27 Several factors influence this. The most important of them is the political composition 
of the parliament pointing to strong presidential parties. They often hold an absolute majority 
of votes in the chamber before which the cabinet bears political responsibility. This means that 
the presidential power is not threatened by the existence of a significant, unfavourable to the 
head of state, political force in the legislature.
28 As a result, after the onset of the democratisation process in the early 1990s, monism of 
the executive power, in which the office of the prime minister does not occur at all, has become 
a rare institutional design. An overwhelming majority of former French colonies adopted 
the conception of the executive in which the president was accompanied by the government 
composed of the prime minister and other ministers. This does not mean, however, that the 
scope of presidential power has been significantly reduced. I.M. Fall, op.cit., pp. 16–20.
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tration of power in the hands of the head of state). Hence, reforms going in 
the opposite direction should not be surprising. The Republic of Congo may 
serve as an example of such evolution29. One of the most characteristic phe-
nomena in the group of states under discussion is, undoubtedly, dynamics 
of constitutional changes covering relations between the legislative and ex-
ecutive, as well as the internal structure of the latter branch of government. 
Although the direction of such constitutional reforms in the analyzed coun-
tries is often very different, it is undisputed that presidentialism, embedded 
not only in fundamental theoretical requirements of this model, but also in 
concrete designs of contemporary French constitutionalism, is still a note-
worthy proposal to be based on while constructing the most desired system-
ic solutions within a given institutional architecture.
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